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I n t r o d u c t i o n
Iterated admissibility (weak dominance) is a long-standing and attractive solution concept, making strong predictions in many games, e.g. the forward° induction path in signalling games and the backward-induction path in perfect° information trees. Yet its logical basis has remained unclear. The dlmculty appears to be this. The 'philosophy' behind iterated admissibility is that a player, Ann say, should consider everything possible; in particular, she should assign strictly positive probability to each of Bob's strategies. Now turn to Bob. If he assumes that Ann adheres to the foregoing 'philosophy,' then he should rule out the possibility that Ann will choose an inadmissible strategy, i.e., he should assign zero probability to these of Ann's strategies. But if Bob, like Ann, adheres to the everything-is-possible philosophy, he should give all of Ann's strategies positive probability. We seem to have reached some kind of contradiction.
This paper provides a logical basis for iterated admissibility. It provides epistemic conditions-i.e, conditions on the rationality of the players in the game, on what the players assume about one another's rationality, etc.-under which the players will indeed choose iteratively admissible strategies. There are two central features of the analysis:
i. It is assumed that the players possess lexicographic probability systems as in Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel (1991) . Specifically, each (type of each) player possesses a sequence of probability measures satisfying certain conditions, and prefers one strategy to another if the sequence of expected utilities associated with the first is lexicographically greater than the sequence associated with the second.
ii. It is assumed that the players operate in a complete sequential probability structure. Fix a two-person finite strategic-form game, and let S a and S b be the strategy sets of the two players. To this description, a sequential probability structure appends type sets T a and T b. Each element of T a, i.e. each type of player a, is associated with a sequence of probability measures on (an appropriate a-field of subsets of) S b x T b. Likewise, each element of T b, i.e. each type of player b, is associated with a sequence of probability measures on (an appropriate a-field of subsets of) S c' × T% Such a structure is complete 1 if for each sequence of probability measures on S b x T b there is a type of player a with that sequence, and for each sequence of probability measures on S ~ × T a there is a type of player b with that sequence. Roughly speaking then, a structure is complete if all possible types are present.
To state the main result of the paper, some definitions are needed: Say there is a first-order assumption of rationality if each player is rational. Say there is a second-order assumption of rationality if each player is rational and assumes the other is rational. And so on. Next, call a strategy of a player 1-admissible if it is admi.qsible. Call a strategy 2-adrnissible if it is admissible in the restricted game obtained by deleting all 1-admissible strategies from the orig~ai game. And so on.
We can now state the main theorem: Fix a complete sequential probability structure. Fix also a state of the world at which there is an rnth-order assumption of rationality, for some integer rn = 0,1, .... Then the strategies at that state are m-admissible. Conversely, fix an m-admissible strategy for each player, for some integer m. Then there is a state of the world at which there is an ruth-order assumption of rationality, and these strategies are chosen.
At the conceptual level, the theorem reveals the true 'philosophy' behind iterated admissibility. It is not enough, as we said earlier, that Ann should consider each of Bob's strategies possible. Rather, she considers possible both every strategy that Bob might play and every type that Bob might be. (Likewise, Bob considers possible both every strategy that Arm might playand every type that Ann might be.) The paper shows that it is this notion, when properly formalized, that yields the conclusion that the players will choose iteratively admissible strategies.
The present paper is related to Asheim (1999) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) , Board (1998) , and Ewerhart (2000) 
L e x i c o g r a p h i c P r o b a b i l i t y S y s t e m s
By a Polish space we will mean a complete separable metrizable space. Given a Polish space f/, let .A,t(~) be the space of all Borel probability measures on ~ with the topology of weak convergence, so that .Ad(n) is again a Polish space. By the empty measure on f~ we will mean the function that assigns 0 to every Borel subset of f/. Let .A4~(f/) be .A4(f/) with the empty measure added as a new point at distance 1 from every point of ~. Then .Adr(~) is again a Polish space, with the empty measure as an isolated point, and so (.A4~(~)) N is Polish with the product topology. Now define .M°°(f/) to be the subspace of (.A4r(I2)) N consisting of all infinite sequences from .Ad(fl) and all finite sequences from .A4(f/) followed by infinitely many empty measures. That is: ~r = (P0 .... ) E .A4°°(12) if and only if for each n, if Pn is the empty measure then/z,~+l is the empty measure. Then .A4°°(f~) with the induced metric is a closed subset of (.A4~(12)) N, and hence is a Polish space.
The length l(cr) of a sequence ~r = (P0,--• ) E .A4°°(f~) is defined as the least n such that Pn is the empty measure, and is cx~ if there is no such n. • , Pn-1) E £(f~), the set U,~-i is to be thought of as the player's primary 'hypothesis' about the true state. But the player recognizes that his primary hypothesis might be mistaken, and so he also forms a secondary hypothesis, as represented by the set Un-2. And so on, until the nth hypothesis U0 .s Condition (iii) says that the player 'considers everything possible.'
L e m m a 1 In Definition I, if condition (ii) holds then the sets Ui may be chosen so that they form a partition of fL

L e m m a 2 In Definition 1, condition (iii) is equivalent to:
2 A full draft will contain a proper discussion of the literature. 3Note, then, that the sequence (Po,... ,/~n-1) begins with the least significant measure.
(iii ") for each nonempty open set U there is an i such that #i(U) > O.
Definition 2 A set E is assumed under a (at leve! j) ira E £(~) and there is a j < l(a) such that: (i) i~i(E) = 1 for all j < i < l(a), (ii} i~ i(E) = 0 for all i < j, (iii) E _C Ui_>j Supp/.~.
One can provide a characterization of conditions (i)-(iii) in this definition in terms of the player's preferences over acts. In these terms, to say that the player assumes E is to say that he acts as he would if he were to know E. (Technically, conditions (i) and (ii) say that the consequences in the states in E are determining for strict preference. Condition (iii) is a kind of regularity condition, and says that 'all of E should matter.')
Epistemics
This section develops a formalism, i~olving sequences of measures, with which to talk about the rationality of the players in a game, what the players assume about one another's rationality, etc. The main result of the paper is:
Definition 3 Fix nonempty finite sets S a and S b. An (S a, Sb)-based (inter-
T h e o r e m 1 Fi.~ a complete (S a, Bb)-based sequential probability structure (Ba, ~b, T a, Tb, ~a ~b) and payoff functions ~r a and 7r b. at which there is an ruth-order assumption of rationality.
